In yesterday's Guardian newspaper (28th March, 2022) Robin Dunbar writes under the heading 'The big idea: do we still need religion?'. He begins with an interesting archeological discovery made during the building of the HS2 line to Birmingham, UK. Evidence has been found of people placing plates with bread and salt on the bodies of the deceased prior to burial. Before the coffin was closed, a village 'sin-eater' ate the bread and salt from the plate on the lap of the deceased and, in return, was given some coins and ale for their trouble. This sin-eater was usually a beggar and only too willing to take the rewards. By eating the bread, the sin-eater absorbed the sins of the deceased person, cleansing them for the next world. This practice was recorded as late as 1906.
Dunbar suggests that we might expect society to move away from such superstitious practices as we become "better educated and more scientifically orientated." He offers the observation that religious people are, on average, happier, healthier and live longer. "For better or worse, they also have an easier death when the time comes." The writer gives other examples of religious people flourishing spiritually, though he doesn't cite any sources. He then goes on to give various hormonal and evolutionary explanations for religious feelings.
I have no doubt that many, if not the majority, of these scientific explanations have real value and truth, but I always get a feeling with these types of harmonal and evolutionary explanations for religious feelings that a big chunk of the equation is missing. Firstly, consider a sceptical or Humean view. There may be strong evidence of an associative relationship between harmones and certain feelings but this doesn't mean it is causal. The Humean rule, foundational to science, is that an associative relationship doesn't prove a causal relationship. We don't know the direction of travel between the two. The hormones could be causing the feelings or the feelings could be causing the harmones. The causal nexus of truth could be on either side of the equation - or neither. It doesn't seem to me that the writer takes this into account. There is a material scepticism at the heart of the article that isn't a true form of skepticism. Materialism must also be doubted by the true sceptic.
Take the above example of the sin-eater. There is a difference between the actions of eating the bread and the resonant feelings about the after-life such actions express. Many societies have different rituals that are expressions of these deep feelings about a continuity of identity of the soul and some kind of cosmic purpose or teleology. Such rituals and actions signify an intense subjectivity on the part of the community where the practice occurs and embody a claim to be able to see beyond what is immediately perceptible.
The scientifically minded sceptic would not consider such subjectivity to have the where-with-all to tell us anything about the underlying structure of reality - call it 'objective' reality. It can only tell us about human behaviour. It is of anthropological interest only. Therefore it seems counter-intuitive to suggest the true sceptic might consider this subjectivity to have something to tell us about objective reality. It would place the true sceptic outside the realm of science. Maybe this is an area for artists and writers, but maybe this is too comfortable.
If we separate the feelings of 'something beyond' from the rituals (i.e. the signifiers) can we ask if such feelings have any claim to 'knowledge'? Is there even a remote chance they could give an insight into the ultimate nature of reality? Can any part of the metaphysical picture we glean from such feelings have truth functionality, even at an intuitive and unfalsifiable level? Or must they be regarded as having no empirical value towards knowledge of something beyond the material? In other words, can we say that the extreme subjectivity at the centre of these rituals reflects no objective reality whatsoever? Instead, must we consider such feelings to be the product of evolutionary and harmonal pressures only? Must we take it as a given that there are evolutionary reasons for the consolations of religion, even if we do not know exactly what they are? We accept as axiomatic that in the future the truth will be explained in purely materialistic terms.
If so, then how do I approach, for instance, Wordworth's feelings of the Sublime as conveyed in 'The Prelude'? The poem expresses a feeling that there is a higher immanent mindfulness in nature. Should I consider the poet's feelings to be ultimately the product of evolutionary forces only and reflect nothing about the ultimate nature of reality, though it comes from contemplations on his observations of nature but not scientific experimentation? If I want to truely understand what's going on in the poem, must I consider it only in the light of non-subjective forces? Should English literature studies, therefore, adopt evolutionary studies as the ultimate underpinning of the subject?
Let's say I have a sympathetic response to Wordsworth's central idea and I 'feel' there is something true about it 'out there in the world'. Should I disregard these feelings? Should I treat my response as an object of anthropological interest only? Is this ever fully realisable with your own true feelings? Can a process of self-reflection reveal the evolutionary forces at play in my being stirred by Wordsworth's poetry. Could poetry survive its substantial themes being considered secondary to evolutionary forces?
Is Wordsworth's notion of the Sublime a form of superstition that should be junked as society becomes 'more educated and scientific'? If not, then do I distinguish between 'sophisticated' and 'unsophisticated' expressions of subjectivity, so that Wordsworth could be considered 'sophisticated' and the villagers who believe in the sin-eaters to be 'unsophisticated'? What criteria do you use to validate such a claim? Could it be that the feelings at the heart of what the villagers experience is the same or similar to Wordsworth's but the expressions of them less sophisticated? If I lump the villagers and Wordsworth into the same 'superstitious' boat, do I contrast them with the extreme objectivity of science? Is it even fair on science to say it is an extreme form of objectivity? Does any scientist deny there is a degree of subjectivity in science? Where is the dividing line?
Dunbar suggests that we might expect society to move away from such superstitious practices as we become "better educated and more scientifically orientated." He offers the observation that religious people are, on average, happier, healthier and live longer. "For better or worse, they also have an easier death when the time comes." The writer gives other examples of religious people flourishing spiritually, though he doesn't cite any sources. He then goes on to give various hormonal and evolutionary explanations for religious feelings.
I have no doubt that many, if not the majority, of these scientific explanations have real value and truth, but I always get a feeling with these types of harmonal and evolutionary explanations for religious feelings that a big chunk of the equation is missing. Firstly, consider a sceptical or Humean view. There may be strong evidence of an associative relationship between harmones and certain feelings but this doesn't mean it is causal. The Humean rule, foundational to science, is that an associative relationship doesn't prove a causal relationship. We don't know the direction of travel between the two. The hormones could be causing the feelings or the feelings could be causing the harmones. The causal nexus of truth could be on either side of the equation - or neither. It doesn't seem to me that the writer takes this into account. There is a material scepticism at the heart of the article that isn't a true form of skepticism. Materialism must also be doubted by the true sceptic.
Take the above example of the sin-eater. There is a difference between the actions of eating the bread and the resonant feelings about the after-life such actions express. Many societies have different rituals that are expressions of these deep feelings about a continuity of identity of the soul and some kind of cosmic purpose or teleology. Such rituals and actions signify an intense subjectivity on the part of the community where the practice occurs and embody a claim to be able to see beyond what is immediately perceptible.
The scientifically minded sceptic would not consider such subjectivity to have the where-with-all to tell us anything about the underlying structure of reality - call it 'objective' reality. It can only tell us about human behaviour. It is of anthropological interest only. Therefore it seems counter-intuitive to suggest the true sceptic might consider this subjectivity to have something to tell us about objective reality. It would place the true sceptic outside the realm of science. Maybe this is an area for artists and writers, but maybe this is too comfortable.
If we separate the feelings of 'something beyond' from the rituals (i.e. the signifiers) can we ask if such feelings have any claim to 'knowledge'? Is there even a remote chance they could give an insight into the ultimate nature of reality? Can any part of the metaphysical picture we glean from such feelings have truth functionality, even at an intuitive and unfalsifiable level? Or must they be regarded as having no empirical value towards knowledge of something beyond the material? In other words, can we say that the extreme subjectivity at the centre of these rituals reflects no objective reality whatsoever? Instead, must we consider such feelings to be the product of evolutionary and harmonal pressures only? Must we take it as a given that there are evolutionary reasons for the consolations of religion, even if we do not know exactly what they are? We accept as axiomatic that in the future the truth will be explained in purely materialistic terms.
If so, then how do I approach, for instance, Wordworth's feelings of the Sublime as conveyed in 'The Prelude'? The poem expresses a feeling that there is a higher immanent mindfulness in nature. Should I consider the poet's feelings to be ultimately the product of evolutionary forces only and reflect nothing about the ultimate nature of reality, though it comes from contemplations on his observations of nature but not scientific experimentation? If I want to truely understand what's going on in the poem, must I consider it only in the light of non-subjective forces? Should English literature studies, therefore, adopt evolutionary studies as the ultimate underpinning of the subject?
Let's say I have a sympathetic response to Wordsworth's central idea and I 'feel' there is something true about it 'out there in the world'. Should I disregard these feelings? Should I treat my response as an object of anthropological interest only? Is this ever fully realisable with your own true feelings? Can a process of self-reflection reveal the evolutionary forces at play in my being stirred by Wordsworth's poetry. Could poetry survive its substantial themes being considered secondary to evolutionary forces?
Is Wordsworth's notion of the Sublime a form of superstition that should be junked as society becomes 'more educated and scientific'? If not, then do I distinguish between 'sophisticated' and 'unsophisticated' expressions of subjectivity, so that Wordsworth could be considered 'sophisticated' and the villagers who believe in the sin-eaters to be 'unsophisticated'? What criteria do you use to validate such a claim? Could it be that the feelings at the heart of what the villagers experience is the same or similar to Wordsworth's but the expressions of them less sophisticated? If I lump the villagers and Wordsworth into the same 'superstitious' boat, do I contrast them with the extreme objectivity of science? Is it even fair on science to say it is an extreme form of objectivity? Does any scientist deny there is a degree of subjectivity in science? Where is the dividing line?
RSS Feed